Title: Going Nuclear: Explaining Divergent Outcomes in Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions

Project Description:

On September 11, 2017, the United Nations Security Council passed a new set of sanctions against North Korea, or the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK). The sanctions were passed in response to a severe uptick in tension across the globe as the DPRK continues to conduct a series of missile and nuclear tests despite widespread international condemnation of their actions. The problems presented by the DPRK nuclear program stand in sharp contrast to Iran, a state that was also internationally condemned for its nuclear program until an agreement was reached at the negotiating table in 2016. In both cases, the state was found in violation of international agreements pertaining to the safe use of nuclear material. And in both cases, crippling economic sanctions were passed in a series of ever more stringent resolutions through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Why is it that those sanctions led to negotiations and agreement in the case of Iran, and failed to dissuade the DPRK from pursuing its nuclear ambition?

This project also raises supplementary questions including: Why did states implement the sanctions more thoroughly for Iran than for DPRK? Why were states more afraid of the possibility of an Iranian nuclear arsenal and what role does fear play in sanctions implementation and nonproliferation cases? How does the market structure impact sanctions effectiveness, particularly in nonproliferation cases? How does technology acquisition impact nonproliferation? I address these supplementary questions through several illustrative case studies, including the nuclear programs of Iraq and Libya, and the AQ Khan network.

My research fills a gap in the literature, as my dataset represents the first dataset to fully capture sanctions implementation for nuclear nonproliferation cases. It also allows for the ability to test implementation as a variable of sanction success in a more robust way than past scholarship.  Finally, my supplementary questions extend the argument out in multiple directions: looking both at the sanction senders and the black market that develops as a result of sanctions. These topics have not yet been addressed in a single volume.